Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proofs have played a significant role in the theory of cryptography. However, lack of efficiency has prevented them from being used in practice. One of the roots of this inefficiency is that non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs have been constructed for general NP-complete languages such as Circuit Satisfiability, causing an expensive blowup in the size of the statement when reducing it to a circuit. The contribution of this paper is a general methodology for constructing very simple and efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proofs that work directly for groups with a bilinear map, without needing a reduction to Circuit Satisfiability.
Introduction
Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proofs have played a significant role in the theory of cryptography. However, lack of efficiency has prevented them from being used in practice. Our goal is to construct efficient and practical non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs and non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) proofs.
Blum, Feldman and Micali [BFM88] introduced NIZK proofs. Their paper and subsequent work, e.g. [FLS99, Dam92, KP98, DDP02] , demonstrates that NIZK proofs exist for all of NP. Unfortunately, these NIZK proofs are all very inefficient. While leading to interesting theoretical results, such as the construction of public-key encryption secure against chosen ciphertext attack by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN00] , they have therefore not had any impact in practice.
Since we want to construct NIZK proofs that can be used in practice, it is worthwhile to identify the roots of the inefficiency in the above mentioned NIZK proofs. One drawback is that they were designed with a general NP-complete language in mind, e.g. Circuit Satisfiability. In practice, we want to prove statements such as "the ciphertext encrypts a signature on the message " or "the three commitments , , contain messages , , so = ". An NP-reduction of even very simple statements like these gives us big circuits containing thousands of gates and the corresponding NIZK proofs become very large.
While we want to avoid an expensive NP-reduction, it is still desirable to have a general way to express statements that arise in practice instead of having to construct non-interactive proofs on an ad hoc basis. A useful observation in this context is that many public-key cryptography protocols are based on finite abelian groups. If we can capture statements that express relations between group elements, then we can express statements that come up in practice such as "the commitments , , contain messages so = " or "the plaintext of is a signature on ", as long as those commitment, encryption, and signature schemes work over the same finite group. We will therefore construct NIWI and NIZK proofs for group-dependent languages.
The next issue to address is where to find suitable group-dependent languages. We will look at statements related to groups with a bilinear map, which have become widely used in the design of cryptographic protocols. Not only have bilinear groups been used to give new constructions of such cryptographic staples as public-key encryption, digital signatures, and key agreement (see [Pat05] and the references therein), but bilinear groups have enabled the first constructions achieving goals that had never been attained before. The most notable of these is the Identity-Based Encryption scheme of Boneh and Franklin [BF03] (see also [BB04a, BB04b, Wat05] ), and there are many others, such as Attribute-Based Encryption [SW05, GPSW06] , Searchable Public-Key Encryption [BCOP04, BSW06, BW06] , and One-time Double-Homomorphic Encryption [BGN05] . For an incomplete list of papers (currently over 200) on the application of bilinear groups in cryptography, see [Bar06] .
Our Contribution
For completeness, let us recap the definition of a bilinear group. Please note that for notational convenience we will follow the tradition of mathematics and use additive notation 1 for the binary operations in 1 and 2 . We have a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes a security parameter as input and outputs (n, 1 , 2 , , , 1 , 2 ). In some cases, 1 = 2 and 1 = 2 , in which case we write (n, , , , ).
• 1 , 2 , are descriptions of cyclic groups of order n.
• The elements 1 , 2 generate 1 and 2 respectively.
• : 1 × 2 is a non-degenerate bilinear map so ( 1 , 2 ) generates and for all , ∈ ℤ n we have ( 1 , 2 ) = ( 1 , 2 ) .
• We can efficiently compute group operations, compute the bilinear map and decide membership.
In this work, we develop a general set of highly efficient techniques for proving statements involving bilinear groups. The generality of our work extends in two directions. First, we formulate our constructions in terms of modules over commutative rings with an associated bilinear map. This framework captures all known bilinear groups with cryptographic significance -for both supersingular and ordinary elliptic curves, for groups of both prime and composite order. Second, we consider all mathematical operations that can take place in the context of a bilinear group -addition in 1 and 2 , scalar point-multiplication, addition or multiplication of scalars, and use of the bilinear map. We also allow both group elements and exponents to be "unknowns" in the statements to be proven.
Since we cover all operations over the bilinear group, we can prove any statement formulated in terms of the operations associated with the bilinear group. With our level of generality, it would for example be easy to write down a short statement, using the operations above, that encodes " is an encryption of the value committed to in under the product of the two keys committed to in and " where the encryptions and commitments being referred to are existing cryptographic constructions based on bilinear groups. Logical operations like AND and OR are also easy to encode into our framework using standard techniques in arithmetization.
The proof systems we build are non-interactive. This allows them to be used in contexts where interaction is undesirable or impossible. We first build highly efficient witness-indistinguishable proof systems, which are of independent interest. We then show how to transform these into zero-knowledge proof systems. We also provide a detailed examination of the efficiency of our constructions in various settings (depending on what type of bilinear group and cryptographic assumption is used).
The security of constructions arising from our framework can be based on any of a variety of computational assumptions about bilinear groups (3 of which we discuss in detail here). Thus, our techniques do not rely on any one assumption in particular.
Informal statement of our results. We consider equations over variables from 1 , 2 and ℤ n as described in Figure 1 . We construct efficient witness-indistinguishable proofs for the simultaneous satisfiability of a set of such equations. The witness-indistinguishable proofs have perfect completeness and there are two computationally indistinguishable types of common reference strings giving respectively perfect soundness and perfect witness indistinguishability. We refer to Section 2 for precise definitions.
We also consider the question of non-interactive zero-knowledge. We show that we can give zeroknowledge proofs for multi-scalar multiplication in 1 or 2 and for quadratic equations in ℤ n . We can also give zero-knowledge proofs for pairing product equations with = 1. When ∕ = 1 we can still give zero-knowledge proofs if we can find 1 , 1 , . . . , , such that = ∏ =1 ( , ).
Instantiation 1: Subgroup decision. Throughout the paper, we will give a general description of our techniques. We will also offer three instantiations that illustrate the use of our techniques. We note that there are many other possible instantiations. The first instantiation is based on the composite order groups introduced by Boneh, Goh and Nissim [BGN05] . Here we generate a composite order bilinear group (n, , , , ) where n = pq. We can write = p × q , where p , q are the subgroups of prime order p and q respectively. Boneh, Goh and Nissim introduced the subgroup decision assumption, which says that it is hard to distinguish a random element from from a random element from q . In this paper, we will demonstrate that assuming the hardness of the subgroup decision problem there exists a witness-indistinguishable proof for satisfiability of a set of equations from Figure 1 in the subgroup p and the order p subgroup of .
Pairing product equation:
for constants , 1 ∈ 1 and , ∈ ℤ n .
Multi-scalar multiplication equation in 2 :
for constants ℬ , 2 ∈ 2 and , ∈ ℤ n .
Quadratic equation in ℤ n :
a We list variables in ℤn in two separate groups because we will treat them differently in the NIWI proofs. If we wish to deal with only one group of variables in ℤn we can add equations in ℤn of the form 1 = 1, 2 = 2, etc.
b With multiplicative notation, these equations would be multi-exponentiation equations. We use additive notation for 1 and 2, since this will be notationally convenient in the paper, but again stress that the discrete logarithm problem will typically be hard in these groups. Instantiation 2: SXDH. Let (p, 1 , 2 , , , 1 , 2 ) be a prime order bilinear group. The external Diffie-Hellman (XDH) assumption is that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard in one of the groups 1 or 2 [Sco02, BBS04, BGdMM05, GR04, Ver04]. The Symmetric XDH assumption is that the DDH problem is hard in both 1 and 2 . We will construct a witness-indistinguishable proof for satisfiability of a set of equations of the form given in Figure 1 under the SXDH assumption.
Instantiation 3: DLIN. The decisional linear assumption (DLIN) for a prime order bilinear group (p, , , , ) introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [BBS04] states that given ( , , , , ) for random , , , ∈ ℤ p it is hard to tell whether = + or is random. Assuming the hardness of the DLIN problem, we will construct a witness-indistinguishable proof for satisfiability of a set of equations from Figure 1.
The instantiations illustrate the variety of ways bilinear groups can be constructed. We can choose prime order groups or composite order groups, we can have 1 = 2 and 1 ∕ = 2 , and we can make various cryptographic assumptions. All three security assumptions have been used in the cryptographic literature to build interesting protocols.
For all three instantiations, the techniques presented here yield efficient witness-indistinguishable proofs. In particular, the cost in proof size of each extra equation is constant and independent of the number of variables in the equation. The size of the proofs, can be computed by adding the cost, measured in group elements from 1 or 2 , of each variable and each equation listed in Figure 2 . We refer to Section 7 for more detailed tables. Figure 2: Number of group elements each variable or equation adds to the size of a NIWI proof.
Subgroup

Related Work
As we mentioned before, early work on NIZK proofs demonstrated that all NP-languages have noninteractive proofs, however, did not yield efficient proofs. One cause for these proofs being inefficient in practice was the need for an expensive NP-reduction to e.g. Circuit Satisfiability. Another cause of inefficiency was the reliance on the so-called hidden bits model, which even for small circuits is inefficient. Groth, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [GOS06b, GOS06a] investigated NIZK proofs for Circuit Satisfiability using bilinear groups. This addressed the second cause of inefficiency since their techniques give efficient proofs for Circuit Satisfiability, but to use their proofs one must still make an NP-reduction to Circuit Satisfiability thus limiting the applications. We stress that while [GOS06b, GOS06a] used bilinear groups, their application was to build proof systems for Circuit Satisfiability. Here, we devise entirely new techniques to deal with general statements about equations in bilinear groups, without having to reduce to an NP-complete language.
Addressing the issue of avoiding an expensive NP-reduction we have works by Boyen and Waters [BW06, BW07] that suggest efficient NIWI proofs for statements related to group signatures. These proofs are based on bilinear groups of composite order and rely on the subgroup decision assumption.
Groth [Gro06] was the first to suggest a general group-dependent language and NIZK proofs for statements in this language. He investigated satisfiability of pairing product equations and only allowed group elements to be variables. He looked at the special case of prime order groups , with a bilinear map : × → and, based on the decisional linear assumption [BBS04] , constructed NIZK proofs for such pairing product equations. However, even for very small statements, the very different and much more complicated techniques of Groth yield proofs consisting of thousands of group elements (whereas ours would be in the tens). Our techniques are much easier to understand, significantly more general, and vastly more efficient.
We summarize our comparison with other works on NIZK proofs in Figure 3 . We note that there have been many earlier works (starting with [GMR89] ) dealing with efficient interactive zero-knowledge protocols for a number of algebraic relations. Here, we focus on non-interactive proofs. We also note that even for interactive zero-knowledge proofs, no set of techniques was known for dealing with general algebraic assertions arising in bilinear groups, as we do here. [GOS06b, GOS06a, Gro06] start by constructing non-interactive proofs for simple statements and then combine many of them to get more powerful proofs. The main building block in [GOS06b] , for instance, is a proof that a given commitment contains either 0 or 1, which has little expressive power on its own. Our approach is the opposite: we directly construct proofs for very expressive languages; as such, our techniques are very different from previous work.
New Techniques
The way we achieve our generality is by viewing the groups 1 , 2 , as modules over the ring ℤ n . The ring ℤ n itself can also be viewed as a ℤ n -module. We therefore look at the more general question of satisfiability of quadratic equations over ℤ n -modules 1 , 2 , with a bilinear map, see Section 3 for details. Since many bilinear groups with various cryptographic assumptions and various mathematical properties can be viewed as modules we are not bound to any particular bilinear group or any particular assumption.
Given modules 1 , 2 , with a bilinear map, we construct new modules 1 , 2 , , also equipped with a bilinear map, and we map the elements in 1 , 2 , into 1 , 2 , . The latter modules will typically be larger thereby giving us room to hide the elements of 1 , 2 ,
. More precisely, we devise commitment schemes that map variables from 1 , 2 to the modules 1 , 2 . The commitment schemes are homomorphic both with respect to the module operations and also with respect to the bilinear map.
Our techniques for constructing witness-indistinguishable proofs are fairly involved mathematically, but we will try to present some high level intuition here. (We give more detailed intuition later in Section 6, where we present our main proof system). The main idea is the following: because our commitment schemes are homomorphic and we equip them with a bilinear map, we can take the equation that we are trying to prove, and just replace the variables in the equation with commitments to those variables. Of course, because the commitment schemes are hiding, the equations will no longer be valid. Intuitively, however, we can extract out the additional terms introduced by the randomness of the commitments: if we give away these terms in the proof, then this would be a convincing proof of the equation's validity (again, because of the homomorphic properties). But, giving away these terms might destroy witness indistinguishability. Suppose, however, that there is only one "additional term" introduced by substituting the commitments. Then, because it would be the unique value which makes the equation true, giving it away would preserve witness indistinguishability! In general, we are not so lucky. But if there are many terms, that means that these terms are not unique, and because of the nice algebraic environment that we work in, we can randomize these terms so that the equation is still true, but so that we effectively reduce to the case of there being a single term being given away with a unique value.
Applications
Independently of our work, Boyen and Waters [BW07] have constructed non-interactive proofs that they use for group signatures (see also their earlier paper [BW06] ). These proofs can be seen as examples of the NIWI proofs in instantiation 1.
Subsequent to the announcement of our work, several papers have built upon it: Chandran, Groth and Sahai [CGS07] have constructed ring-signatures of sub-linear size using the NIWI proofs in the first instantiation, which is based on the subgroup decision problem. Groth and Lu [GL07] have used the NIWI and NIZK proofs from instantiation 3 to construct a NIZK proof for the correctness of a shuffle. Groth [Gro07] has used the NIWI and NIZK proofs from instantiation 3 to construct a fully anonymous group signature scheme. Belenkiy, Chase, Kohlweiss and Lysyanskaya [BCKL08] have used instantiations 2 and 3 to construct non-interactive anonymous credentials. Green and Hohenberger [GH08] use instantiation 3 in a universally composable adaptive oblivious transfer protocol. Also, by attaching NIZK proofs to semantically secure public-key encryption in any instantiation we get an efficient non-interactive verifiable cryptosystem. Boneh [Bon06] has suggested using this for optimistic fair exchange [Mic03] , where two parties use a trusted but lazy third party to guarantee fairness.
Roadmap
The main result is the NIWI proof that can be found in Section 7. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 explain the structure of the NIWI proof, which goes through modules, commitments, a description of the common reference string, and an explanation of how the NIWI proof works. For a concrete illustration of the steps, we refer the reader to Instantiation 1 in Section 8. Other instantiations are given in Sections 9 and 10. In many cases, our NIWI proofs can also be used as NIZK proofs, which we discuss in Section 11.
2 Non-interactive Witness-Indistinguishable Proofs NOTATION. We write = ( ; ) when the algorithm , on input and randomness , outputs . We write ← ( ) for the process of picking randomness uniformly at random and setting = ( ; ). More generally, we write ← for sampling from the set according to some probability distribution on , using the uniform distribution as the default when nothing else is specified.
We write ← ; ← ( ); . . . for running the experiment where is chosen from , then is chosen from , which may depend on , etc. This yields a probability distribution over the outputs and we write Pr
for the probability of the condition ( , , . . .) being satisfied after running the experiment.
The security of our schemes is governed by a security parameter , which can be used to scale up the security. Given two functions , : ℕ → [0, 1] we write ( ) ≈ ( ) when | ( ) − ( )| = ( − ) for every constant . We say that is negligible when ( ) ≈ 0 and that it is overwhelming when ( ) ≈ 1. We say that two families of probability distributions { 1 ( )} ∈ℕ , { 2 ( )} ∈ℕ are indistinguishable when they are the same for all sufficiently large ∈ ℕ, and we say they are computationally indistinguishable if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries we have
GROUP DEPENDENT LANGUAGES. Let be an efficiently computable ternary relation. For triplets ( , , ) ∈ we call the setup, the statement and the witness. Given some we let be the language consisting of statements in . For a relation that ignores this is of course the standard definition of an NP-language. We will be more interested in the case where describes a bilinear group, though.
NON-INTERACTIVE PROOFS.
A non-interactive proof system for a relation with setup consists of four probabilistic polynomial time algorithms: a setup algorithm , a common reference string (CRS) generation algorithm , a prover and a verifier . The setup algorithm outputs a setup ( , ). In our paper, will be a description of a bilinear group. The setup algorithm may output some related information , for instance the factorization of the group order. A cleaner case, however, is when is just the empty string, meaning the protocol is built on top of the group without knowledge of any trapdoors. The CRS generation algorithm takes ( , ) as input and produces a common reference string . The prover takes as input ( , , , ) and produces a proof . The verifier takes as input ( , , , ) and outputs 1 if the proof is acceptable and 0 if rejecting the proof. We call ( , , , ) a non-interactive proof system for with setup if it has the completeness and soundness properties described below. PERFECT COMPLETENESS. A non-interactive proof is complete if an honest prover can convince an honest verifier whenever the statement belongs to the language and the prover holds a witness testifying to this fact. We say ( , , , ) is perfectly complete if for all adversaries we have 2
PERFECT SOUNDNESS. A non-interactive proof is sound if it is impossible to prove a false statement. We say ( , , , ) is perfectly sound if for all adversaries we have
PERFECT co -SOUNDNESS. In the standard definition of soundness given above, the adversary tries to create a valid proof for ∈¯ . Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [GOS06b, Gro06] generalized standard soundness to co-soundness, which says that it is impossible to create a valid proof for a statement ∈ co , where co is a language that may depend on and . Standard soundness is a special case of co-soundness with co =¯ , but co-soundness can be used to capture other interesting cases as well: Instantiation 1 in Section 8 offers an example where co-soundness captures the fact that soundness holds in the order p subgroups of and . We say ( , , , ) is perfectly co -sound if for all adversaries we have
COMPOSABLE WITNESS INDISTINGUISHABILITY. A statement may have many possible witnesses. A noninteractive proof is witness indistinguishable if the proof does not reveal which of those witnesses the prover has used. We will use a strong definition of witness indistinguishability called composable witness indistinguishability. We introduce a reference string simulator that generates a simulated CRS and require that the adversary cannot distinguish a real CRS from a simulated CRS. We also require that on a simulated CRS there is no information whatsoever to distinguish the different witnesses that might have been used to construct the proof. We say ( , , , ) is composable witness indistinguishable, if there is a probabilistic polynomial time simulator , such that for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries we have
and for all adversaries we have
where we require ( , , 0 ), ( , , 1 ) ∈ . COMPOSABLE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE. A zero-knowledge proof, is a proof that shows the statement is true, but does not reveal anything else. Traditionally, this is defined by having a simulator ( 1 , 2 ) that can simulate respectively the CRS and the proof. The first part of the simulator outputs a simulated CRS and a simulation trapdoor , and the second part of the simulator uses the simulation trapdoor to simulate proofs for statements without knowing the corresponding witnesses. The standard definition of (multi-theorem) zero-knowledge then says that real proofs on a real CRS should be computationally indistinguishable from simulated proofs on a simulated CRS.
We will obtain a strong notion of zero-knowledge, called composable zero-knowledge [Gro06] . Composable zero-knowledge implies standard zero-knowledge [Gro06] and has the advantage that it is simpler to work with, since it separates the computational indistinguishability into two separate parts addressing respectively the CRS and the proofs. In composable zero-knowledge, the real CRS and the simulated CRS are computationally indistinguishable. Moreover, the adversary, even when it gets access to the secret simulation key , cannot distinguish real proofs from simulated proofs on a simulated CRS.
We say ( , , , ) is composable zero-knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator ( 1 , 2 ) so for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries we have
where outputs ( , , ) ∈ .
Modules with Bilinear Maps
Let (ℛ, +, ⋅, 0, 1) be a finite commutative ring. Recall that an ℛ-module is an abelian group ( , +, 0) where the ring acts on the group such that
A cyclic group of order n can in a natural way be viewed as a ℤ n -module. We will observe that all the equations in Figure 1 can be viewed as equations over ℤ n -modules with a bilinear map. To generalize completely, let ℛ be a finite commutative ring and let 1 , 2 , be finite ℛ-modules with a bilinear map : 1 × 2 → . We will consider quadratic equations over variables 1 , . . . ,
In order to simplify notation, let us for 1 , . . . ,
The equations can now be written as
We note for future use that due to the bilinear properties of , we have for any matrix Γ ∈ Mat × (ℛ) and for any ⃗ ∈ 1 , ⃗ ∈ 2 that ⃗ ⋅ Γ⃗ = Γ ⊤ ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ . Let us now return to the equations in Figure 1 and see how they can be recast as quadratic equations over ℤ n -modules with a bilinear map.
Pairing product equations: Define
and we can rewrite 3 the pairing product equation
Multi-scalar multiplication in 1 : Define ℛ = ℤ n , 1 = 1 , 2 = ℤ n , = 1 , ( , ) = and we can rewrite the multi-scalar multiplication equation as
= 2 , ( , ) = and we can rewrite the multi-scalar multiplication equation as
We will therefore first focus on the more general problem of constructing non-interactive composable witness-indistinguishable proofs for satisfiability of quadratic equations over ℛ-modules 1 , 2 , (using additive notation for all modules) with a bilinear map .
Commitment from Modules
In our NIWI and NIZK proofs we will commit to the variables 1 , . . . , ∈ 1 , 1 , . . . , ∈ 2 . We do this by mapping them into other ℛ-modules 1 , 2 and making the commitments in those modules.
Let us for now just consider how to commit to elements from one ℛ-module . The public key for the commitment scheme will describe another ℛ-module and ℛ-linear maps : → and : → . Operations in the module and computation of the map will be efficiently computable but is hard to compute. 4 The public key will also contain elements 1 , . . . , ˆ ∈ . To commit to ∈ we pick 1 , . . . , ˆ ← ℛ at random and compute the commitment
Our commitment scheme will have two types of commitment keys.
Hiding key: A hiding key is of the form ( , , , 1 , . . . , ˆ ) where
therefore perfectly hides the element when 1 , . . . , ˆ are chosen at random from ℛ.
Binding key: A binding key is of the form ( , , , 1 , . . . , ˆ ) where ∀ : ( ) = 0 and ∘ is non-trivial.
The commitment := ( ) + ∑ˆ
=1
therefore contains the non-trivial information ( ) = ( ( )) about . In particular, if ∘ is the identity map on , then the commitment is perfectly binding to .
Computational indistinguishability:
The main assumption that we will be making throughout this paper is that the distribution of hiding keys and the distribution of binding keys are computationally indistinguishable. Witness-indistinguishability of our NIWI proofs and later the zero-knowledge property of our NIZK proofs will rely on this property.
The treatment of commitments using the language of modules generalizes several previous works dealing with commitments over bilinear groups, including [BGN05, GOS06b, GOS06a, Gro06, Wat06] .
Since we will often be committing to many elements at a time let us define some convenient notation. Given elements 1 , . . . , ∈ we will write ⃗ := (⃗ ) + ⃗ with ∈ Mat ×ˆ (ℛ) for making commitments 1 , . . . , computed as := ( ) + ∑ˆ
=1
.
Setup
In our NIWI and NIZK proofs the setup and the common reference string are
Part of the common reference string specifies 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , . . . , ˆ and 2 , 2 , 2 , 1 , . . . , ˆ that are commitment keys for 1 and 2 . We note that many of these components may be given implicitly instead of being described explicitly in the common reference string.
Another part of the common reference string specifies a third ℛ-module together with ℛ-linear maps : → and : → and a bilinear map : 1 × 2 → . We require that the maps are commutative as described in Figure 4 below and with the exception of that they are efficiently computable. For notational convenience, we define for ⃗ ∈ 1 , ⃗ ∈ 2 that
Due to the bilinear properties of we have for all vectors and matrices with appropriate dimensions
The final part of the common reference string is a set of matrices 1 , . . . , ∈ Matˆ ×ˆ (ℛ) that all satisfy ⃗ • ⃗ = 0. The exact number of matrices 1 , . . . , that is needed, depends on the concrete setting. In many cases, we need no matrices at all and we have = 0, but there are also cases where they are needed as we shall see in Instantiation 3 in Section 10.
There will be two different settings of interest to us.
Soundness setting: In the soundness setting, we have binding commitment keys. This means 1 (⃗ ) = ⃗ 0 and Witness-indistinguishability setting: In the witness-indistinguishability setting we have hiding commitment keys, so 1 ( 1 ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩ and 2 ( 2 ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩. We also require that 1 , . . . , generate the -module of all matrices ∈ Matˆ ×ˆ (ℛ) so ⃗ • ⃗ = 0. As we will see in the next section, these matrices play a role in the randomization of the NIWI proofs.
Computational indistinguishability: The (only) computational assumption this paper is based on is that the two settings can be set up in a computationally indistinguishable way. The instantiations show that there are many ways to get such computationally indistinguishable soundness and witnessindistinguishability setups.
Proving that Committed Values Satisfy a Quadratic Equation
Recall that in our setting, a quadratic equation looks like the following:
with constants ⃗ ∈ 1 , ⃗ ∈ 2 , Γ ∈ Mat × (ℛ), ∈ . We will first consider the case of a single quadratic equation of the above form. The first step in our NIWI proof will be to commit to all the variables ⃗ , ⃗ . The commitments are of the form
with ∈ Mat ×ˆ (ℛ), ∈ Mat ×ˆ (ℛ). The prover's task is to convince the verifier that the commitments contain ⃗ ∈ 1 , ⃗ ∈ 2 that satisfy the quadratic equation. (Note that for all equations we will use these same commitments.)
Intuition. Before giving the construction let us give some intuition. In the previous sections, we have carefully set up our commitments so that the commitments themselves also "behave" like the values being committed to: they also belong to modules (the modules) equipped with a bilinear map (the map , also implicitly used in the • operation). Given that we have done this, a natural idea is to take the quadratic equation (1), and "plug in" the commitments (2) in place of the variables; let us evaluate:
After some computations, where we expand the commitments (2), make use of the bilinearity of •, and rearrange terms (the details can be found in the proof of Theorem 1) we get
By the commutative properties of the maps, the first group of three terms is equal to ( ), if Equation 1 holds. Looking at the remaining terms, note that ⃗ and ⃗ are part of the common reference string and therefore known to the verifier. Using the fact that bilinearity implies that for any ⃗ , ⃗ we have ⃗ • Γ⃗ = Γ ⊤ ⃗ • ⃗ , we can sort the remaining terms so that they match either ⃗ or ⃗ to get (again see the proof of Theorem 1 for details)
Now, for sake of intuition, let us make some simplifying assumptions: Let's assume that we're working in a symmetric case where 1 = 2 , and 1 = 2 , and ⃗ = ⃗ and, so, the above equation can be simplified further to get:
) .
Now, suppose the prover gives to the verifier as his proof
. The verifier would then check that the following verification equation holds:
Suppose further 1 ∘ 1 , 2 ∘ 2 , ∘ are the identity maps on 1 , 2 , . It is easy to see that the proof is convincing in the soundness setting, because in that setting we have that 1 (⃗ ) = ⃗ 0. Then the verifier would know (but not be able to compute) that by applying the maps 1 , 2 , we get
This gives us soundness, since ⃗ := 1 (⃗ ) and ⃗ := 2 ( ⃗ ) satisfy the equations. The remaining problem is to get witness-indistinguishability.
Recall that in the witnessindistinguishability setting, the commitments are perfectly hiding. Therefore, in the verification equation, nothing except for ⃗ holds any information about ⃗ and ⃗ (except for the information that can be inferred from the quadratic equation itself). So, let's consider two cases:
1. Suppose that ⃗ is the unique value so that the verification equation is valid. In this case, we trivially have witness indistinguishability, since the uniqueness means that any witness would lead to the same value for ⃗ .
2. The simple case above might seem too good to be true, but let's see what it means if it isn't true. If two values ⃗ and ⃗ ′ both satisfy the verification equation, then just subtracting the equations shows that
On the other hand, recall that in the witness indistinguishability setting, the ⃗ vectors generate the entire space where ⃗ or ⃗ ′ live, and furthermore we know that the matrices 1 , . . . , generate all such that ⃗ • ⃗ = 0. Therefore, let's choose 1 , . . . , at random, and consider the distribution ⃗ ′′ = ⃗ + ∑
=1
⃗ . We thus obtain the same distribution on ⃗ ′′ that satisfies the verification equation regardless of whether we started from ⃗ or ⃗ ′ or any other proof.
Thus, for the symmetric case we obtain a witness indistinguishable proof system. For the general nonsymmetric case, instead of having just ⃗ for the ⃗ part of Equation 3, we would also have a proof ⃗ for the ⃗ part. In this case, we would also have to make sure that this split does not reveal any information about the witness. What we will do is to randomize the proofs such that they get a uniform distribution on all ⃗ , ⃗ that satisfy the verification equation. If we pick ← Matˆ ×ˆ (ℛ) at random we have that ⃗ + ⃗ completely randomizes ⃗ . The part we add in ⃗ can be "subtracted" from ⃗ by observing that
This leads to a uniform distribution of proofs for the general non-symmetric case as well.
Having explained the intuition behind the proof system, we proceed to a formal description and proof of security properties.
and return the proof ( ⃗ , ⃗ ).
Verification: Return 1 if and only if
Perfect completeness of our NIWI proof will follow from the following theorem no matter whether we are in the soundness setting or the witness-indistinguishability setting.
we have for all choices of , 1 , . . . , that the proofs ⃗ , ⃗ constructed as above will be accepted.
Proof. The commutative property of the linear and bilinear maps gives us 1 (⃗ )
For any choice of , 1 , . . . , we have
In the soundness setting, where we have 1 (⃗ ) = ⃗ 0 and 2 (⃗ ) = ⃗ 0, a valid proof implies
Proof. An acceptable proof ⃗ , ⃗ satisfies ( )
The commutative property of the linear and bilinear maps gives us
□ Observe as a particularly interesting case that when 1 ∘ 1 , 2 ∘ 2 , ∘ are the identity maps on 1 , 2 and respectively, then this means ⃗ := 1 (⃗ ) and ⃗ := 2 ( ⃗ ) give us a satisfying solution to the equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ + ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ + ⃗ ⋅ Γ⃗ = . In this case, the theorem says that the proof is perfectly sound in the soundness setting. In the case where they are not the identity maps it is still possible to have co-soundness, see Instantiation 1 8 for an example.
Theorem 3 In the witness-indistinguishable setting where 1 ( 1 ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩, 2 ( 2 ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩ and 1 , . . . , generate all matrices so ⃗ • ⃗ = 0, all satisfying witnesses ⃗ , ⃗ , , yield proofs ⃗ ∈ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩ˆ and ⃗ ∈ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩ˆ that are uniformly distributed conditioned on the verification
Proof. Since 1 ( 1 ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩ and 2 ( 2 ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩ there exists , , , so 1 (⃗ ) = ⃗ , 1 (⃗ ) = ⃗ and 2 ( ⃗ ) = ⃗ , 2 (⃗ ) = ⃗ . We have ⃗ = ( + )⃗ and ⃗ = ( + )⃗ . The proof is (⃗ , ⃗ ) given by
We choose at random, so we can think of ⃗ being a uniformly random variable given by ⃗ = Θ⃗ for a randomly chosen matrix Θ. We can think of ⃗ as being written ⃗ = Π⃗ , where Π is a random variable that depends on Θ.
By perfect completeness all satisfying witnesses yield proofs where
Conditioned on the random variable Θ we therefore have that any two possible solutions
generate all matrices so ⃗ • ⃗ = 0 we can write this as
. In constructing ⃗ we form it as
) ⃗ for randomly chosen 1 , . . . , ∈ ℛ. We therefore get a uniform distribution over all ⃗ that satisfy the equation conditioned on ⃗ . Since ⃗ is uniformly chosen, we conclude that for any witness we get a uniform distribution over ( ⃗ , ⃗ ) conditioned on it being an acceptable proof. □
Linear Equations
As a special case, we will consider the proof system when ⃗ = 0 and Γ = 0. In this case the equation is simply ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ = .
The scheme can be simplified in this case by choosing = 0 in the proof, which gives ⃗ := ⃗ 0 and ⃗ :=
⃗ . Theorem 1 still applies with = 0. Theorem 2 says 1 (⃗ ) ⋅ 2 ( 2 ( ⃗ )) = ( ( )), which will give us soundness. Finally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4 In the witness-indistinguishable setting where 1 ( 1 ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩, 2 ( 2 ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩ and 1 , . . . , generate all matrices so ⃗ • ⃗ = 0, all satisfying witnesses ⃗ , ⃗ , , yield the uniform distribution of the proof ⃗ ∈ ⟨ 1 , . . . , ˆ ⟩ˆ conditioned on the verification equation ⃗ • 2 ( ⃗ ) = ( ) + ⃗ • ⃗ being satisfied.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3 we can write ⃗ = Π⃗ . Any witness gives a proof that satisfies
generate all matrices so ⃗ • ⃗ = 0 we have that Π has a uniform distribution over all matrices Π satisfying the verification equation. □
The Symmetric Case
An interesting special case is when := 1 = 2 ,ˆ ≥ˆ with 1 = 1 , . . . , ˆ = ˆ and for all , ∈ we have ( , ) = ( , ). We call this the symmetric case. In the symmetric case, we can simplify the scheme by just padding ⃗ with zeroes in the end to extend the length toˆ , call this vector ⃗ ′ , and reveal the proof ⃗ = ⃗ + ⃗ ′ . In the verification, we check that
Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 still hold in this setting. With respect to soundness we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5 In the soundness setting, where we have 1 (⃗ ) = ⃗ 0 a valid proof implies
Proof. An acceptable proof ⃗ satisfies 1 (⃗ )
□ We can simplify the computation of the proof in the symmetric case. We have
and extend to ′ by padding it withˆ −ˆ 0's. Another way to accomplish this padding is by padding withˆ −ˆ 0-rows and withˆ −ˆ 0-columns and each withˆ −ˆ 0-columns. We then have
Since the map is symmetric we have ⃗ • ( ′ − ( ′ ) ⊤ )⃗ = 0, so we can simplify the proof as
NIWI Proof for Satisfiability of a Set of Quadratic Equations
We will now give the full composable NIWI proof for satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations in a module with a bilinear map. The proof will have co -soundness, where
Observe as an important special case that 1 ∘ 1 , 2 ∘ 2 , ∘ are the identity maps on 1 , 2 and , then co =¯ -soundness making soundness and co -soundness the same notion.
The cryptographic assumption we make is that the common reference string is created by one of two algorithm or and that their outputs are computationally indistinguishable. The first algorithm outputs a common reference string that specifies a soundness setting, whereas the second algorithm outputs a common reference string that specifies a witness-indistinguishability setting.
Witness-indistinguishability string:
Proof: The input consists of , , a list of quadratic equations {(⃗ , ⃗ , Γ , )} =1 and a satisfying witness ⃗ ∈ 1 , ⃗ ∈ 2 .
Pick at random ← Mat ×ˆ (ℛ) and ← Mat ×ˆ (ℛ) and commit to all the variables as ⃗ := ⃗ + ⃗ and ⃗ := ⃗ + ⃗ .
For each equation (⃗ , ⃗ , Γ , ) make a proof as described in Section 6. In other words, pick ← Matˆ ×ˆ (ℛ) and 1 , . . . , ← ℛ and compute
Output the proof (⃗ , ⃗ , {(⃗ , ⃗ )} =1 ).
Verification:
The input is , , {(⃗ , ⃗ , Γ , )} =1 and the proof (⃗ , ⃗ , {(⃗ , ⃗ )}).
For each equation check
Output 1 if all the checks pass, else output 0.
Theorem 6 The protocol given above is a NIWI proof for satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations with perfect completeness, perfect co -soundness and composable witness-indistinguishability.
Proof. Perfect completeness follows from Theorem 1. Consider a proof (⃗ , ⃗ , {(⃗ , ⃗ )}) on a soundness string. Define ⃗ := 1 (⃗ ), ⃗ := 2 ( ⃗ ). It follows from Theorem 2 that for each equation we have
This means we have perfect co -soundness.
Our computational assumption is that soundness strings and witness-indistinguishability strings are computationally indistinguishable. Consider now a witness-indistinguishability string . The commitments are perfectly hiding, so they do not reveal the witness ⃗ , ⃗ that the prover uses in the commitments ⃗ , ⃗ . Theorem 3 says that in each equation either of two possible witnesses yields the same distribution on the proof for that equation. A straightforward hybrid argument then shows that we have perfect witness-indistinguishability. □ Proof of knowledge. We observe that if outputs an additional secret piece of information that makes it possible to efficiently compute 1 and 2 , then it is straightforward to compute the witness ⃗ = 1 (⃗ ) and ⃗ = 2 ( ⃗ ), so the proof is a perfect proof of knowledge.
Proof size. The size of the common reference string isˆ elements in 1 andˆ elements in 2 in addition to the description of the modules, the maps and 1 , . . . , . The size of the proof is + ˆ elements in 1 and + ˆ elements in 2 .
Typically,ˆ andˆ will be small, giving us a proof size that is ( + + ) elements in 1 and 2 . The proof size may thus be smaller than the description of the statement, which can be of size up to elements in 1 , elements in 2 , elements in ℛ and elements in .
NIWI Proofs for Bilinear Groups
We will now outline the strategy for making NIWI proofs for satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations over bilinear groups. As we described in Section 3, there are four different types of equations corresponding to the following four combinations of ℤ n -modules:
Pairing product equations:
Multi-scalar multiplication in 1 :
Multi-scalar multiplication in 2 :
Quadratic equations in
The common reference string will specify commitment schemes to respectively scalars and group elements.
We first commit to all the variables and then make the NIWI proofs that correspond to the types of equations that we are looking at. It is important that we use the same commitment schemes and commitments for all equations, i.e., for instance we only commit to a scalar once and we use the same commitment in the proof whether is involved in is a multi-scalar multiplication in 2 or a quadratic equations in ℤ n . The use of the same commitment in all the equations is necessary to ensure a consistent choice of throughout the proof.
As a consequence of this we use the same module ′ 1 to commit to in both multi-scalar multiplication in 2 and quadratic equations in ℤ n . We therefore end up with at most four different modules 1 , ′ 1 , 2 , ′ 2 to commit to respectively , , , variables.
Instantiation 1: Subgroup Decision
STATEMENT. The setup = (n, , , , ) defines the ring ℤ n and modules ℤ n , , and bilinear maps corresponding to respectively multiplication in ℤ n , scalar-multiplication in , and the pairing : × → . The statement will consist of a set of equations, which are either quadratic equations in ℤ n , multi-scalar multiplication equations in , or pairing product equations. The equations are over exponent variables 1 , . . . , ∈ ℤ n and group element variables 1 , . . . , ∈ .
Pairing product equations: Using our framework this corresponds to ℛ = ℤ n , 1 = , 2 = , = , ( , ) = ( , ) and equations of the form
Multi-scalar multiplication in : Using our framework this corresponds to ℛ = ℤ n , 1 = ℤ n , 2 = , = 2 , ( , ) = and equations of the form
Quadratic equation in ℤ n : Using our framework this corresponds to ℛ = ℤ n , 1 = ℤ n , 2 = ℤ n , = ℤ n , ( , ) = mod n and equations of the form ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ + ⃗ ⋅ Γ⃗ = .
COMMITMENT. We will use two related commitment schemes to commit to elements in respectively ℤ n and . In both cases, we use the ℤ n -module for the commitments. The commitment key, consists of an element ∈ . In a hiding key, is a generator of . In a binding key, has order q and thus only generates the order q subgroup of . The subgroup decision assumption tells us that the two types of commitment key are indistinguishable. Let us describe how to commit to a group element using randomness ∈ ℤ n by defining To commit to an exponent ∈ ℤ n using randomness we define
When generates the commitment is perfectly hiding of . On the other hand, if has order , then ′ ( ) = 0 and the commitment determines ′ ( ) = ∈ ℤ n .
SETUP. The setup and the common reference string together specify (n, , , , , ), which is sufficient to describe the entire setup since the other parts of the common reference string will be given implicitly.
With the notation in the paper we have = 1 = 2 = and = . The bilinear map is ( , ) := ( , ). In the witness-indistinguishability setup we use a hiding key that generates and consequently ( , ) generates . The only solution ∈ Mat 1×1 (ℛ) to ( , ) = 1 is therefore the trivial = 0, so we do not need to include any matrices 1 , . . . , in the common reference string. For pairing equations, we define
The map ∘ projects elements to the order p subgroup of . The first commutative property ( ( ), ( )) = ( ( , )) from Figure 4 is trivial, and since = 1 mod p, = 0 mod q we have 2 = mod n giving us the second commutative property ( ( ), ( )) = ( , ) = ( , ) = ( ( , )). For multi-scalar multiplication equations, we definê
This gives us the required commutative properties ( ′ ( ), ( )) = ( , ) = ( , ) =ˆ ( ) and ′ ( ) ( ) = ( )( ) = =ˆ ( ( , )). For quadratic equations in ℤ n we define
We have the commutative properties
PROOF. We will now give a NIWI proof for satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations of the three types described above. Our NIWI proof is co -sound, where co is the language of sets of quadratic equations over ℤ n that are unsatisfiable in the order p subgroups of ℤ n , and . A valid proof therefore guarantees the simultaneous satisfiability of all the equations in the order p subgroups of ℤ n , and . The reason that we do not get full soundness is that has order q on a soundness string, which prevents interference with the order p subgroups but does enable interference in the order q subgroups.
Setup: ( , ) := ((n, , , , ), (p, q)) ← (1 ), where n = pq.
Soundness string: On input ( , ) return := where := p for random ∈ ℤ * n .
Witness-indistinguishability string: On input ( , ) return := where := for random ∈ ℤ * n .
NIWI proof: On input (n, , , , , ), a set of equations and a witness ⃗ , ⃗ do:
1. Commit to the exponents 1 , . . . , ∈ ℤ n and the group elements 1 , . . . , ∈ by computing := + := + for randomly chosen ⃗ ∈ ℤ n , ⃗ ∈ ℤ n .
2. For each pairing product equation ( ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ )( ⃗ ⋅ Γ ⃗ ) = make a proof as described in section 6.2
For each multi-scalar multiplication equation
For each quadratic equation
Verification: On input (n, , , , , ), a set of equations and a proof ⃗ , ⃗ , { } =1 do:
For each multi-scalar multiplication
Theorem 7 The NIWI proof given above has perfect completeness, perfect co -soundness and composable witness-indistinguishability.
Proof. Perfect completeness follows from Theorem 1. Perfect co -soundness follows from Theorem 2 since the various maps of the form ∘ map to the order p subgroups of ℤ n , and . The subgroup decision problem gives us that we cannot distinguish whether has order q or order n so the two types of common reference strings are computationally indistinguishable. On a witness-indistinguishability string, the commitments are perfectly hiding and we get perfect witness-indistinguishability from Theorem 3. □ SIZE. The size of the NIWI proof is + + group elements in , where is the number of variables in ⃗ , is the number of variables in ⃗ and is the number of equations.
Instantiation 2: SXDH
STATEMENT. The setup = (p, 1 , 2 , , , 1 , 2 ) defines the ring ℤ p and modules ℤ p , 1 , 2 , and bilinear maps corresponding to respectively multiplication in ℤ p , scalar-multiplication in 1 and 2 , and the pairing : 1 × 2 → . The statement will consist of a set of equations, which are either quadratic equations in ℤ p , multi-scalar multiplication equations in 1 or 2 , or pairing product equations. The equations are over exponent variables 1 , . . . , ′ , 1 , . . . , ′ ∈ ℤ p and group element variables 1 , . . . , ∈ 1 and 1 , . . . , ∈ 2 .
Pairing product equations: Using our framework this corresponds to ℛ = ℤ p , 1 = 1 , 2 = 2 , = , ( , ) = ( , ) and equations of the form
Multi-scalar multiplication in 1 : Using our framework this corresponds to
Multi-scalar multiplication in 2 : Using our framework this corresponds to
Quadratic equation in ℤ p : Using our framework this corresponds to
COMMITMENT. Consider a cyclic group of prime order p. With entry-wise addition we get the ℤ p -module := 2 . The commitment key is of the form
where ← ℤ * p is chosen at random. We can choose 2 = ( , ) in two different ways: 2 := 1 or 2 := 1 − ( , ) for a random ∈ ℤ * p . The former choice of 2 gives a perfectly binding commitment key, whereas the latter choice of 2 gives a perfectly hiding commitment key. The two types of commitment keys are computationally indistinguishable under the DDH assumption.
Let us now describe how to commit to an element ∈ using randomness 1 , 2 ∈ ℤ p :
On a binding key where 2 = 1 we have that ∘ is the identity map on and ( 1 ) = ( 2 ) = . The commitment = (( 1 + 2 ) , ( 1 + 2 ) + ) corresponds to an ElGamal encryption of . If 1 and
On a hiding key we have = 1 so ∈ ⟨ 1 ⟩, which implies ′ (ℤ p ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 ⟩. A hiding key therefore gives us a perfectly hiding commitment scheme. On a binding key ′ ∘ ′ is the identity map and ′ ( 1 ) = 0 so the commitment scheme is perfectly binding, and in fact the commitment = (( + ) , ( + ) + ) is an ElGamal encryption of .
SETUP. The common reference string is of the form ( 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 ), where ( 1 , 2 ) is a commitment key for the group 1 implicitly defining maps 1 , 1 , ′ 1 , ′ 1 as described above, and ( 1 , 2 ) is a commitment key for 2 implicitly defining maps 2 , 2 , ′ 2 , ′ 2 as described above.
We have 1 = 2 1 , 2 = 2 2 and we define := 4 with addition being entry-wise multiplication. The map is defined as follows:
On a witness-indistinguishability string, we have hiding commitment keys 1 , 2 and 1 , 2 so the two pairs of vectors are linearly independent. The four elements ( 1 , 1 ), ( 1 , 2 ), ( 2 , 1 ), ( 2 , 2 ) are linearly independent in the witness-indistinguishability scenario. This implies that ⃗ • ⃗ = 0 only has the trivial solution where is the 2 × 2 matrix with 0-entries. Therefore, the common reference string does not need to include any matrices 1 , . . . , for the pairing product equations. The same holds true for the other types of equations, we do not need any matrices 1 , . . . , in the common reference string. For pairing product equations we define the maps : → 4 and : 4 → as follows
21 22
The map corresponds to first ElGamal decrypting down the columns using 1 where 1 = ( 1 , 1 1 ) and then ElGamal decrypting the resulting row by using 2 where 1 = ( 2 , 2 2 ). We note that ∘ is the identity map. The maps are ℛ-linear and satisfy the two commutative properties in Figure 4 .
For multi-scalar multiplications in 1 , we will need maps˜ : 1 → 4 and˜ : 4 → 1 . For multi-scalar multiplications in 2 we will need mapsˆ : 2 → 4 andˆ : 4 → 2 . The two cases are symmetric, so we will just focus on multi-scalar multiplication in 2 here. We definê
where −1 ( ( 1 , )) := . In the soundness settingˆ ∘ˆ is the identity map on 2 . To see that the maps satisfy the two commutative properties, observe ( ′ 1 ( ), 2 ( )) = ( ′ 1 (1), 2 ( )) =ˆ ( ) by the linearity and bilinearity of the maps, and
For quadratic equations in ℤ p we define the maps ′ : ℤ p → 4 and ′ : 4 → ℤ p as follows
In the soundness setting ′ ∘ ′ is the identity map on ℤ p . To see that the maps satisfy the two commutative properties, observe ( ′ 1 ( ), ′ 2 ( )) = ( ′ 1 (1), 2 ( )) = ′ ( ) by the linearity and bilinearity of the maps, and 1 , 2 2 ), ( 1 2 , 2 2 ))).
PROOF. Having described the details of the common reference string above, we can now give the full NIWI proof.
Soundness string: On input return := ( 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 ) where 2 = 1 1 and 2 = 2 2 for random 1. Commit to the group elements ⃗ ∈ 1 and the exponents ⃗ ∈ ℤ ′ p as
Commit to the group elements ⃗ ∈ 2 and the exponents
For each pairing product equation
= make a proof as described in section 6. Writing it out we have for ← Mat 2×2 (ℤ p ) the following proof
There is a direct correspondence between ⊤ ⃗ = 1 ( ⃗ ) and ⃗ = 1 ( ⊤ ⃗ ). The proof ⃗ can therefore be communicated by sending ⊤ ⃗ , which consists of two group elements. For each linear equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ ℬ = we use ⃗ := ⊤ 2 ( ⃗ ℬ). As above, the proof can be communicated by sending the two group elements ⊤ ⃗ ℬ.
For each multi-scalar multiplication equation
There is a direct correspondence between ⃗ ⊤ ⃗ = 1 ( ⃗ ) and ⃗ = 1 (⃗ ⊤ ⃗ ). The proof can therefore be communicated by sending ⃗ ⊤ ⃗ , which consists of one group element. For each linear equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ = 1 the proof is ⃗ := ⊤ ′ 2 ( ⃗ ). As above, the proof can be communicated by sending the two field elements ⊤ ⃗ .
The proof ⃗ can therefore be communicated by sending ⊤ ⃗ , which consists of two field elements.
For each linear equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ ℬ = 2 the proof is := ⃗ ⊤ 2 ( ⃗ ℬ). As above, the proof can be communicated by sending the single group element ⃗ ⊤ ⃗ ℬ.
For each quadratic equation
There is a direct correspondence between ⃗ ⊤ ⃗ = ′ 1 ( ) and = ′ 1 (⃗ ⊤ ⃗ ). The proof can therefore be communicated by sending ⃗ ⊤ ⃗ , which consists of one field element. For each linear equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ = we use := ⃗ ⊤ ′ 2 ( ⃗ ). As above, the proof can be communicated by sending the single field element ⃗ ⊤ ⃗ .
Verification: On input ( , ), a set of equations and a proof ⃗ , ⃗ , ⃗ ′ , ⃗ ′ , {⃗ , ⃗ } =1 do:
For each multi-scalar equation
⃗ ⋅ ⃗ + ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ + ⃗ ⋅ Γ⃗ = 1 in 1 with proof (⃗ , ) check that 1 ( ⃗ ) • ⃗ ′ + ⃗ • ′ 2 ( ⃗ ) + ⃗ • Γ ⃗ ′ =˜ ( 1 ) + ⃗ • ⃗ + ( , 1 ). 3. For each multi-scalar equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ + ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ ℬ + ⃗ ⋅ Γ ⃗ = 2 in 2 with proof ( , ⃗ ) check that ′ 1 (⃗ ) • ⃗ + ⃗ ′ • 2 ( ⃗ ℬ) + ⃗ ′ • Γ ⃗ =ˆ ( 2 ) + ( 1 , ) + ⃗ • ⃗ .
For each quadratic equation
Theorem 8 The protocol is a NIWI proof with perfect completeness, perfect soundness and composable witness-indistinguishability for satisfiability of a set of equations over a bilinear group where the SXDH problem is hard.
Perfect completeness follows from Theorem 1. Perfect soundness follows from Theorem 2 since the ∘ maps are identity maps on ℤ p , 1 , 2 and . The SXDH assumption gives us that the two types of common reference strings are computationally indistinguishable. On a witness-indistinguishability string, the commitments are perfectly hiding and we get perfect witness-indistinguishability from Theorem 3. □ SIZE. The modules we work in are 1 = 2 1 and 2 = 2 2 , so each element in a module consists of two group elements from respectively 1 and 2 . Table 5 
Instantation 3: DLIN
STATEMENT. The setup = (p, , , , ) describes three ℤ p -modules ℤ p , and . The statement will consist of a set of equations, which are either quadratic equations in ℤ p , multi-scalar multiplication equations in , or pairing product equations. The equations are over exponent variables 1 , . . . , ℤ p and group element variables 1 , . . . , ∈ .
Pairing product equations: Using our framework this corresponds to ℛ = ℤ p , 1 = , 2 = , = , ( , ) = ( , ) and equations of the form ( ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ )( ⃗ ⋅ Γ ⃗ ) = .
Multi-scalar multiplication in : Using our framework this corresponds to ℛ = ℤ p , 1 = ℤ n , 2 = , = 2 , ( , ) = and equations of the form
Quadratic equation in ℤ n : Using our framework this corresponds to ℛ = ℤ p , 1 = ℤ n , 2 = ℤ n , = ℤ n , ( , ) = mod p and equations of the form ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ + ⃗ ⋅ Γ⃗ = .
COMMITMENT. We will now describe how to commit to elements in ℤ p or group elements in . The commitments will belong to the ℤ p -module = 3 formed by entry-wise addition. The commitment key is of the form where , ← ℤ * p . The vector 3 can be chosen as either 3 := 1 + 2 or 3 := 1 + 2 − ( , , ) giving respectively a binding key and a hiding key. The DLIN assumption is that it is hard to tell whether three elements , , have the property that = + , which implies that the two types of commitment keys are computationally indistinguishable.
For committing to ∈ using randomness ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) ← ℤ 3 p we define
On a hiding key 1 , 2 , 3 are linearly independent so they form a basis for = 3 and therefore ( ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 , 2 , 3 ⟩ so the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding. On a binding key we have ∘ is the identity map and ( 1 ) = ( 2 ) = ( 3 ) = so the commitment is perfectly binding, and in fact = (
where := 3 + ( , , ). On a hiding key, we have that = 1 + 2 so ′ (ℤ p ) ⊆ ⟨ 1 , 2 ⟩ and the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding. On a binding key, ′ ∘ ′ is the identity map on ℤ p and ′ ( 1 ) = ′ ( 2 ) = 0 so the commitment = (( 1 + ) , ( 2 + ) , ( 1 + 2 + ( + )) + ) is perfectly binding.
SETUP. The common reference string is of the form ( 1 , 2 , 3 ), which implicitly defines maps , , ′ , ′ and commitment schemes in = 3 as described above.
We use the module := 9 with addition corresponding to entry-wise multiplication. We use two different bilinear maps ,˜ . The map˜ is defined as follows:
The symmetric map is defined by
For pairing product equations we define 
The map corresponds to first decrypting down the columns using the decryption key , for the linear encryption scheme [BBS04] and then decrypting along the resulting row. We note that ∘ is the identity map. Both˜ and satisfy the two commutative properties in Figure 4 .
Some computation shows that the nine elements˜ ( , ) are linearly independent in the witnessindistinguishability setting. This implies that ⃗ • ⃗ only has the trivial solution where is the 3 × 3 matrix with 0-entries. On the other hand, the map has non-trivial solutions to ⃗ • ⃗ corresponding to the identities ( , ) = ( , ). Some computation shows that the matrices Since these matrices are fixed, we do not need to define them explicitly in the common reference string. We will now look at the case of multi-scalar multiplication in . We definẽ
In the soundness setting˜ ∘˜ andˆ ∘ˆ are the identity maps on .˜ satisfies the two commutative properties, since by the linear and bilinear properties give˜
also satisfies the two commutative properties, since the bilinearity gives us ( ′ ( ), ( )) = ( ′ (1), ( )) =ˆ ( ) and ′ ( ) ( ) = 1 2
In the witness-indistinguishability setting ( 1 , 2 )• ⃗ = 0 only has the trivial solution where is the 2 × 3 matrix containing 0-entries, whereas 1 = ( 0 1 0
Finally, we have the case of quadratic equations in ℤ p . We definẽ
On a soundness string˜ ′ ∘ ′ and ′ ∘ ′ are the identity maps on ℤ p . satisfies the commutative properties from Figure 4 , since by the linear and bilinear properties 1 , 2 , 3 ), ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) ). also satisfies the two commutative properties, since the bilinearity gives us
For˜ we only have the trivial matrices , whereas for we have the non-trivial basis 1 = ( 0 1 −1 0
PROOF. Having described the modules, maps and matrices that are implicitly given by the common reference string above, we are now ready to give the full NIWI proof. 
Proof: For notational convenience let ⃗ = ( 1 , 2 ). On input , , a set of equations and a witness ⃗ , ⃗ do:
1. Commit to the exponents ⃗ ∈ ℤ p and the group elements ⃗ ∈ as
2. For each pairing product equation ( ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ )( ⃗ ⋅ Γ ⃗ ) = make a proof as described in section 6 using the symmetric map and random 1 , 2 , 3 ← ℤ p .
For each linear equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ = we use the asymmetric map˜ to get the proof
The reason we use the asymmetric˜ for the linear equation is that there are no non-trivial matrices so ⃗ • ⃗ = 0, which simplifies the proof. Observe that ⃗ = ( ⊤ ⃗ ) = ⊤ ( ⃗ ) and vice versa ( ⃗ ) = ⊤ ⃗ is easily computable in this special setting, since ( ) = ( , , ). We can therefore just reveal the proof ⃗ := ( ⃗ ) = ⊤ ⃗ , which consists of only three group elements.
3. For each multi-scalar multiplication equation
we use the symmetric map . There is one matrix 1 that generates all so ⃗ • ⃗ . The proof is for random 1 ← ℤ p
It suffices to reveal the value ⃗ = ⊤ ⃗ . Since ⃗ determines ⃗ uniquely, this does not compromise the perfect witness-indistinguishability we have on witness-indistinguishability strings. The verifier can compute ⃗ = ′ ( ⃗ ). The proof now consists of only 3 elements in ℤ p .
For each linear equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ ℬ = we use˜ to get the proof
We can use ⃗ = ⊤ ⃗ ℬ as the proof, since it allows the verifier to compute ⃗ = ( ⃗ ). The proof therefore consists of only 2 group elements.
4. For each quadratic equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ + ⃗ ⋅ Γ⃗ = in ℤ p we use the symmetric map . There is one matrix 1 that generates all so ⃗ • ⃗ . The proof is for random 1 ← ℤ p
For each linear equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ = we use the asymmetric map˜ to get the proof ⃗ := ⊤ ′ ( ⃗ ). It suffices to reveal just ⃗ = ⊤ ⃗ , from which the verifier can compute ⃗ = ′ ( ⃗ ).
Verification: On input ( , ), a set of equations and a proof ⃗ , ⃗ , { ⃗ } =1 do:
For each linear equation ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ = with proof ⃗ check
For each multi-scalar multiplication
For each quadratic equation
Theorem 9 The protocol is a NIWI proof with perfect completeness, perfect soundness and composable witness-indistinguishability for satisfiability of a set of equations over a bilinear group where the DLIN problem is hard.
Perfect completeness follows from Theorem 1. Perfect soundness follows from Theorem 2 since the ∘ maps are identity maps on ℤ p , and . The DLIN assumption gives us that the two types of common reference strings are computationally indistinguishable. On a witness-indistinguishability string, the commitments are perfectly hiding and we get perfect witness-indistinguishability from Theorem 5. □ SIZE. The module we work in is = 3 , so each element in the module consists of three group elements from . In some of the linear equations, we can compute ( ⃗ ) efficiently and we have ( ( ⃗ )) = ⃗ which gives us a shorter proof. Table 6 
Zero-Knowledge
We will now show that in many cases it is possible to make zero-knowledge proofs for satisfiability of quadratic equations. An obvious strategy is to use our NIWI proofs directly, however, one could imagine such proofs might not be zero-knowledge because the zero-knowledge simulator might not be able to compute any witness for satisfiability of the equations. It turns out that the strategy is better than it seems at first sight though; we will often be able to modify the set of quadratic equations into an equivalent set of quadratic equations where a witness can be found and which has the same distribution of proofs. We will consider the case where 1 = ℛ, 2 = , ( , ) = . We remark that it is quite common to have 1 = ℛ; in bilinear groups both multi-scalar multiplication equations in 1 , 2 and quadratic equations in ℤ n have this structure.
The first stage of the simulator 1 will output a witness-indistinguishability string and a simulation trapdoor that makes it possible to trapdoor open the commitments in 1 . More precisely, = ⃗ ∈ ℛˆ so 1 (1) = 1 (0) + ⃗ ⊤ ⃗ . Define := 1 (1), which is a commitment to = 1. The idea in the simulation is that we can rewrite the statement as
We have introduced a new variable and by choosing all variables to be 0 gives a satisfying witness. In the simulation, the simulator 2 will use the trapdoor information to open to 0 and it can now use the NIWI proof from Section 7.
Setup: ( , ) := ((ℛ, 1 , 2 , , ), ) ← (1 ), where 1 = ℛ and 2 = .
Soundness string:
NIZK proof: This protocol is exactly the same as in the NIWI proof, we do not even need to rewrite the equations. The input consists of , , a list of quadratic equations {(⃗ , ⃗ , Γ , )} =1 and a satisfying witness ⃗ , ⃗ .
Pick at random ← Mat ×ˆ (ℛ) and ← Mat ×ˆ (ℛ) and commit to all the variables as ⃗ := 1 (⃗ ) + ⃗ and ⃗ := 2 (⃗ ) + ⃗ . For each equation (⃗ , ⃗ , Γ , ) make a proof as described in Section 6. In other words, pick ← Matˆ ×ˆ (ℛ) and 1 , . . . , ← ℛ and compute
Verification: The input is , , {(⃗ , ⃗ , Γ , )} =1 and the proof (⃗ , ⃗ , {(⃗ , ⃗ )}).
Simulation string: Pick at random ← Mat ×ˆ (ℛ) and ← Mat ×ˆ (ℛ) and commit to all the variables as ⃗ := ⃗ 0 + ⃗ and ⃗ := ⃗ 0 + ⃗ . We also use := 1 (1) = 1 (0) + ⃗ ⊤ ⃗ and append it to ⃗ . For each modified equation (⃗ , ⃗ , − , Γ , 0) make a proof as described in Section 6. Return the simulated proof {(⃗ , ⃗ , ⃗ , ⃗ )} =1 .
Theorem 10 The protocol described above is a composable NIZK proof for satisfiability of pairing product equations with perfect completeness, perfect co -soundness and composable zero-knowledge.
Proof. Perfect completeness on a soundness string follows from the perfect completeness of the NIWI proof. The simulator knows an opening of := 1 (1) to = 1 (0) + ∑ˆ
=1
. It therefore knows a witness ⃗ 0, ⃗ 0, = 0 for satisfiability of all the modified equations. It therefore outputs a proof {(⃗ , ⃗ , ⃗ , ⃗ )} =1 such that for all we have The commutative property of the maps gives us ( 1 (1), 2 ( )) = ( (1, )) = ( ), so the NIZK proofs satisfy the equations the verifier checks. Perfect completeness on a simulation string now follows from the perfect completeness of the NIWI proof as well.
Since the NIZK proof is exactly the same as the NIWI proof, there is no additional cost associated with getting composable zero-knowledge for full quadratic equations. If we look at linear equations, there are two cases to consider. On a linear equation of the form ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ = , the simulator can rewrite it as ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ + (− , ) = 0, which is a linear equation of the same form. The shorter NIWI proofs for this type of linear equations can therefore also be perfectly simulated on a simulation string. NIWI proofs for linear equations of the form ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ = on the other hand cannot be simulated as easily, because if the simulator rewrites the equation as ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ + (− , ) = 0, then it is no longer a linear equation. To get composable zero-knowledge for the latter type of linear equation, the prover can instead use the NIWI proof for the full quadratic equation.
NIZK Proofs for Bilinear Groups
Let us now consider bilinear groups and the four types of quadratic equations given in Figure 1 . If we set up the common reference string such that we can trapdoor open respectively ′ 1 (1) and ′ 2 (1) to 0 then multiscalar multiplication equations and quadratic equations in ℤ n are of the form for which we can get a perfect simulation.
In the case of pairing product equations we do not know how to get zero-knowledge, since even with the trapdoors we may not be able to compute a witness. We do observe though that in the special case, where all = 1 the choice of ⃗ = ⃗ , ⃗ = ⃗ is a satisfactory witness. Since we also use the witness ⃗ = ⃗ , ⃗ = ⃗ in the other types of equations, the simulator can use this witness in the simulation. In the special case where all = 1 we can therefore make NIZK proofs for satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations.
In another special case where we have a pairing product equation with = ∏ =1 ( , ) for some known , there is another technique that can be useful to get zero-knowledge. In this case, we can add the equations − = to the set of multi-scalar multiplication equations in 2 and rewrite the pairing product equation as ( ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ )( ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ ℬ)( ⃗ ⋅ ⃗ )( ⃗ ⋅ Γ ⃗ ) = 1. This gives us pairing product equations of the type where we can make zero-knowledge proofs. We can therefore also make zero-knowledge proofs for a set of quadratic equations over a bilinear group if all the pairing product equations have of the form = ∏ =1 ( , ) for some known , . The case of pairing product equations points to a couple of differences between witness-indistinguishable proofs and zero-knowledge proofs using our techniques. NIWI proofs can handle any target , whereas zeroknowledge proofs can only handle special types of target . Furthermore, if ∕ = 1 the size of the NIWI proof for this equation is constant, whereas the NIZK proof for the same equation may be larger.
We conclude our discussion of NIZK proofs with Figure 7 and Figure 8 that give the costs for proving the satisfiability of a set of quadratic equations in the SXDH and DLIN instantiations. For the subgroup decision instantiation, NIZK proofs for sets of quadratic equations where all = 1 are the same as those given in Table 1 .
Conclusion and an Open Problem
Our main contribution in this paper is the construction of efficient non-interactive cryptographic proofs for use in bilinear groups. Our proofs can be instantiated with many different types of bilinear groups and the security of our proofs can be based on many different types of intractability assumptions. We have given three concrete examples of instantiations based on respectively the subgroup decision assumption, the SXDH assumption and the DLIN assumption. We have been interested in bilinear groups and have in our instantiations based the modules on bilinear groups. Our techniques generalize beyond bilinear groups though; we do for instance not require the modules to be cyclic as is the case for bilinear groups. It is possible that other types of modules with a bilinear map exist, which are not constructed from bilinear groups. The existence of such modules might lead to efficient NIWI and NIZK proofs based on entirely different intractability assumptions. We leave the construction of such modules with a bilinear map as an interesting open problem.
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